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Abstract 
 
The crisis of the sovereign debt forced the Portuguese government to reach out for joint financial help from 
the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the European Central Bank. The Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) stresses the need for a major redefinition of the Portuguese local government 
system. Currently, the Portuguese local government is structured in two tiers (308 municipalities and 4259 
parishes), both with an executive and deliberative elected bodies. The Portuguese government was asked to 
present a plan to amalgamate these local entities in order to enhance service delivery, improve efficiency 
and reduce costs.  The main argument used is that excessive territorial fragmentation undermines efficiency 
and precludes scale economies. 
 
The main objective of the paper is to test two competing hypotheses regarding local government spending 
present in the consolidation/fragmentation literature. The Tiebout (1956) tradition argues that 
fragmentation induces lower spending through competition between local governments offering different 
taxes-services packages – the Leviathan model (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). This argument is in sharp 
opposition with the supporters of amalgamations arguing that territorial centralization can produce 
economies of scale and significant cost savings, reduce overlaps, and promote better accountability 
(Rosenfeld and Reese 2004). These hypotheses are tested with data collected from all 278 local 
governments of continental Portugal. We measure local government spending both in terms of total 
expenditures and grant transfers to parish governments and territorial fragmentation as the number of parish 
governments per 1000 individuals. Our findings show that higher levels of fragmentation lead to increased 
local government expenditures and transfers to parish governments, thus suggesting that the amalgamation 
proposed by the MoU and mandated by national legislation is likely to induce cost savings and improve 
financial sustainability. 
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The most recent financial crisis drove Portuguese government to reach out for 
help in order to solve sovereignty debt problem. One of the reforms agreed upon in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Portuguese government with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), and the European Central 
Bank (ECB) is the need to challenge and modify the organization and structure of the 
local government system. The Portuguese government is required to elaborate a plan 
seeking territorial amalgamation of subnational governments. While municipalities face a 
voluntary process of amalgamation, parishes are under pressure to accomplish a 
mandatory reform.  
Parishes are the smallest level of government in the Portuguese local government 
system and the first access point of citizens to public authority.1 In most of the cases, 
parish governments are highly dependent on financial resources granted by the central 
government and municipalities. Central government grants to parishes are based on a 
fixed formula, but municipal grants to parishes are much more flexible and the result of 
discretionary power by municipal governments.  
The official reform guidelines argue that territorial fragmentation, particularly 
municipal fragmentation in parish governments, causes excessive local government 
spending and transfers to these sub-city governments. The aim of this paper is to analyse 
whether territorial fragmentation within municipalities is a determinant of municipal 
government expenditures and transfers to parishes or if, alternatively, other factors 
unrelated with fragmentation are at play.  
Since the 1980s, a remarkable number of academics have examined the effects of 
metropolitan fragmentation upon local spending. Much of this work looks at metropolitan 
fragmentation and finds support for the argument that territorial fragmentation and local 
government competition decreases spending due to more efficient service provision 
attributed to Tiebout-type effects (Schneider 1986; Marlow 1988; Boyne 1992; Hendrick, 
Jimenez and Lal 2011). However, most of these works take place in the United States, 
where highly competitive metropolitan settings suggest that citizen-voters choose 
between different local government tax-service packages and where competition leads to 
lower municipal government expenditures (Bish 1971; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 
1961; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; see Frisken and Norris 2001). 
Our work contributes to this body of knowledge in two ways. First, we debate the 
effect of fragmentation upon local government expenditures in a much less competitive 
setting. Second, to our knowledge, this work is the first attempt in the literature to 
investigate how the internal fragmentation of municipalities affects the size of the 
municipal government in general, and the size of municipal grants to sub-city 
governments in particular. The key argument is that the amount of local expenditures and 
the size of municipal government transfers to parishes is a function of the level of 
municipal fragmentation.  
At a time when national and sub-national governments face challenges to control 
and decrease spending, uncertainty remains as to whether a decentralized or consolidated 
local government system is more appropriated to accomplish these goals. Supporters of 
                                                            
1 Portuguese municipalities are divided into a lower tier of sub-city governments called parishes. Portugal 
has a total of 308 municipalities and 4259 parishes. This manuscript employs the terms ‘sub-city 
government’ and ‘parish government’ interchangeably.  
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decentralized governance argue the need to keep the current territorial organization to 
protect civic engagement, choice, competition and an accurate representation of citizen 
choices and preferences. Amalgamation promoters follow the MoU approach and defend 
the need for a more centralized structure in order to promote scale economies and to 
avoid pork barrel policies and the duplication and overproduction of public services. The 
attempts to bridge these opposing views have argued for the need to improve municipal 
cooperation and utility sharing, but the current context limits voluntary cooperation as a 
viable short-term solution. 
We gathered data from all 278 municipal jurisdictions in continental Portugal and 
employ OLS regression to test how territorial fragmentation affects municipal 
expenditures. The results provide evidence that supports the amalgamation hypothesis, i. 
e., more fragmented municipalities increase total expenditures, capital expenditures, and 
capital grants transfers to sub-city governments.  
This paper is divided in six sections. The first two sections present a brief review 
of the literature and theoretical arguments supporting both government amalgamation and 
fragmentation. These sections introduce the concept of territorial fragmentation and 
discuss previous findings regarding its effect upon the size of local government. The third 
section extends prior arguments concerning municipal fragmentation in a metropolitan 
area to sub-city level fragmentation. Next, we present the research context and the 
Portuguese local government system. Section five presents the empirical analysis, 
including data, methods, and empirical findings. The conclusions of this research are 
presented in the final section along with policy recommendations for territorial reform. 
 
The Rationale for Amalgamation: Scale Economies and the New Regionalism  
During the post-WWII years, functional responsibilities assumed by national 
governments increased substantially, largely motivated by a confidence in the miracles of 
professional planning, effective co-ordination, and large bureaucracies. In face of this 
work overload, many national governments were faced with a structural obstacle in 
transferring service provision responsibilities to local authorities. Many municipalities 
and communes were involved in a minimal number service functions, covered small 
geographical areas, and were characterized by part-time local officials and staff. 
As a result, the explicit political decision to expand the role of the welfare state 
became the primary reason for municipal amalgamations. In economic terms, 
amalgamation supporters argued that service provision covering larger populations would 
be able to take advantage of economies of scale, because service output was assumed to 
increase in a greater proportion than service inputs employed (increasing returns to 
scale). 
The decision to engage in territorial reforms was also motivated by the need to 
create larger municipalities able to provide a large number of services through more 
professional planning staff, full-time committed politicians, and a greater pool of 
financial resources (Bennett 1989; Boyne 1996). Part of this argument falls under the 
heading of economies of scope, suggesting that larger local government units can handle 
task complexity in a more efficient manner (Dollery and Crase 2004). 
The pace and timing of urbanization during the second half of the XX century 
created several new demands on local infrastructure, particularly in terms of water 
supply, sewage and garbage disposal, road maintenance, mass public transportation, 
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housing, and urban-rural clashes. Some local governments were simply too small to cope 
with these mounting pressures; horizontal fragmentation became a liability and an 
obstacle to overcome spillover effects across territorial boundary lines. This was 
especially true for spatially indivisible services (public libraries, health care units, 
pollution control programs, etc.), since fragmentation generates positive externalities and 
leads to the underprovision of these types of services due to free-riding incentives (Boyne 
1992). Each municipality expects their neighbour(s) to invest in these services, but none 
of them wishes to bear the full costs of these decisions. 
Empirical work points out that government fragmentation and dispersion have 
related fiscal problems (Gustely 1977; Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal 2011). A fragmented 
and dispersed local government system is inefficient, loses scale economies and generates 
service duplication. Firstly, fragmentation increases the cost of government because scale 
economies in the provision of local services are lost and average costs are higher. 
Secondly, the overlapping of local governments in some systems leads to inefficiencies 
due to lost opportunities for the coordination of services to avoid duplication. Thirdly, 
various smaller governments in an area create spillover effects so that the actions of one 
government generate benefits (costs) for neighbouring jurisdictions that have not 
contributed (consented) to these actions. All governments have an incentive to become 
free riders resulting in the under-supply of local public goods. Fourthly, citizen 
attribution of credit and blame to local officials will be less accurate in systems with a 
higher number of overlapping governments (Treisman 2007). Thus, fragmentation leads 
to unnecessary growth of government through waste and inefficient organization and, 
consequently, increases the size of the local public sector (Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal 
2011). In this sense, an often-suggested alternative to a fragmented and dispersed system 
is governmental consolidation/amalgamation.  
Territorial amalgamation and fiscal consolidation promotes an increase in size 
that reduces unit costs by capturing economies of scale that make services financially 
sustainable allowing the production and promotion of supplementary goods and services. 
Furthermore, size and consolidation prompt better coordination and allocation of services 
that reduces free-riding behaviour in the case of positive externalities and mitigates 
opportunism associated with negative externalities.  
Recently, the New Regionalists have argued that metropolitan fragmentation is 
not only problematic from an economic perspective but also from a social standpoint 
(Rusk 1993; Downs 1994; Durning 2003). Fragmentation generates racial and class 
homogeneity within governmental boundaries and significant disparities and segregation 
across each metropolitan area, thus making regional problems much more difficult to 
address. In contrast, consolidation improves the likelihood that regional problems are 
addressed in a comprehensive manner to enhance equity of social opportunities and 
promote economic development (Lowery 2000). 
 
The Rationale for Fragmentation: Tiebout Model, Competition, and Efficiency 
Beginning in the end of the 1960s, political economists working from a public 
choice perspective have taken an opposing view to consolidation. Criticizing pro-
amalgamation supporters, political economists argued that fragmentation leads to greater 
competition among local governments through Tiebout’s (1956) fiscal exit mechanism, 
leading to increased governmental efficiency and a better match between citizen 
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preferences and local government tax-and-service packages. The Leviathan hypothesis 
developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1977) suggests that local government competition 
increases the information available to residents about the price and quality of public 
services. As governments are afraid of losing local taxpayers, the delivery of public 
services will be associated with lower spending and significant efficiency gains (Boyne 
1992; Dowding and Mergoupis 2003; Park et al. 2010). The Leviathan hypothesis is 
supported by empirical evidence that fragmentation leads to lower expenditures 
(Schneider 1986; Marlow 1988; Grossman 1989; Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal 2011).  
Furthermore, the efficiency argument stated by the supporters of municipal 
amalgamation is empirically flawed (Boyne 1998; Sancton 2000). The assumption of 
scale economies based on population size and municipal area is incorrect, since: 1) scale 
economies are not uniform across the range of services provided by an individual local 
government (capital-intensive services yield significant economies of scale, but labour-
intensive services usually do not) (Hirsch 1968; Dollery and Crase 2004; Dollery and 
Fleming 2006); 2) management costs increase significantly with increases in population 
size, so that some trade-off point exists after which scale diseconomies begin (Boyne 
1992; 1996); and 3) population size is a bad proxy for service output because service 
costs depend on several factors not related with population size (climate, topography, 
age, income, seasonal fluctuations in target populations, and variations on service quality) 
(Boyne 1996; Dollery, Byrnes and Crase 2007). 
 
The Amalgamation/Fragmentation Debate at the Sub-City Level of Government 
The consolidation versus fragmentation debate has been primarily developed 
around municipal fragmentation within a metropolitan area. This section suggests the 
extension of these theoretical insights to sub-city fragmentation. We discuss and present 
two competing hypothesis in the consolidation/fragmentation tradition and test them in 
the empirical analysis using several indicators of local government expenditures and 
transfers to sub-city governments. 
Territorial fragmentation is directly associated with the number of existing sub-
city governments. As the fragmentation in a jurisdiction increases so does the density of 
representation and, ceteris paribus, this can be considered as a good outcome regarding 
the quality of local democracy. The multiplication of sub-city governments can be 
regarded as a way to improve representation, accountability and public participation 
(Bulut and Taniyici 2006; Tavares et al. 2012).  
However, there is a price to pay for improved representation. The ‘political 
fragmentation’ hypothesis argues that the number of political actors is positively 
correlated with the size of deficits. Empirical work addressing the political fragmentation 
hypothesis has examined and found support for the positive effect of legislative 
fragmentation on the levels of public spending (Volkerink and de Haan 2001; Bradbury 
and Stephenson 2003; Elgie and McMenamin 2008). In the Portuguese context, the city 
council has a mixed composition combining parish (freguesias) representatives and at-
large elected members. Since the city council has the legal competence for budget 
approval it is expected to be a key player in the overall budget negotiation, including 
transfers to sub-city governments.  
Following the law of 1/n, we argue that the institutional rule linking the size of the 
city council to the number of parishes in the municipality leads to increased political 
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fragmentation and generates excessive spending in distributive and geographically-
targeted policies (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson, 1981; Bradbury and Stephenson 2003; 
MacDonald 2008). As a consequence, we expect to find less efficiency in total 
expenditures, capital expenditures, and municipal transfers to parish governments. 
Since municipal grants to parish governments are distributed on a purely 
discretionary basis, it can be expected that these sub-city governments will attempt to 
lobby their parent municipal executive to obtain larger grants (Tavares and Camões 2007; 
2010). Heavily fragmented municipalities will face excessive spending due to lobbying 
activities by their sub-city governments leading to a fiscal tragedy of the commons. Each 
parish executive will use the municipal government as a common pool resource seeking 
to capture a larger proportion of municipal transfers for her/his district and sharing the 
added fiscal burden equally with their counterparts. As a consequence, all sub-city 
governments will choose the same strategy seeking short-term benefits ignoring long-
term allocation inefficiencies and higher taxes (Ostrom 1990; Bradbury and Stephenson 
2003). The result is municipal version of the ‘political fragmentation’ hypothesis where 
the number of political actors in the jurisdiction is positively related with the size of local 
government expenditures and grant transfers to parishes (Velasco 2000; Volkerink and de 
Haan 2001; Elgie and McMenamin 2008).  
This body of work suggests that fragmentation produces inefficient outcomes and 
should be reined in much in the way proposed by the supporters of the 
amalgamation/consolidation perspective and reflected in the MoU signed by the 
Portuguese government. Hence, the ‘amalgamation hypothesis’ is that:  
 
H1a: Higher levels of territorial fragmentation lead to higher municipal government 
expenditures and larger transfers to parishes. 
 
However, the authors from the public choice perspective argue the exact opposite. 
The level of sub-city fragmentation, that is, the way each municipal jurisdiction is 
fragmented into sub-city governments, should produce a higher level of competition 
within the jurisdiction that can lead to lower service production costs and better 
democracy.  
On one hand, when it comes to sub-city fragmentation, it can be argued that the 
existence of a single parish or small set of parishes may result in monopoly or overlap in 
power between the municipal and sub-city governments. In the extreme case of a 
municipality with a single parish government, the sub-city government overlaps with the 
municipal government in terms of service provision leading to either collusion between 
municipal and parish executives that produces an inefficient level of grant transfers or to 
monopoly power by the parish government that can make all-or-nothing demands 
regarding municipal transfers (Niskanen 1968; 1971). Either way, the outcome will be 
higher spending per individual then it would be the case in a fragmented setting. 
Consistently, municipal transfers to sub-city governments will be smaller under a 
fragmented municipality because each parish government will be right-sized and more 
efficient (less expensive) to operate (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; Bish 1971). In 
addition, competition between sub-city governments can improve efficiency and savings 
through benchmarking practices. This will happen as long as the municipal government 
coordinates innovations across parishes through grants in order to overcome 
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informational externalities; in other words, an individual sub-city government can 
promote innovation because the risk associated with a failed innovation is shared with, 
and subsidized by, the municipal government and the more fragmented the municipality 
the lesser risk is involved in experimentation. In the extreme case of a single sub-city 
government, not only there are no competitors to imitate, but also the risk associated with 
experimentation is much larger (Rose-Ackerman 1980; Treisman 2007). 
On the other hand, sub-city fragmentation can also improve democratic 
representation. Since parishes in a highly fragmented municipality are similar to 
neighborhood governments, citizen-voters can choose to live in the sub-city government 
that better matches their preferences (Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; 
Bish 1971). Although there are no substantial differences between Portuguese parishes in 
terms of fiscal packages to promote competition as required by public choice scholars, 
there is still sufficient variation in terms of community profile, services offered, and fees 
charged by each parish government to affect the choices of citizen-voters. As a result of 
both arguments, sub-city fragmentation enforces competition, enhances efficiency, and 
improves the accuracy of democratic representation. 
In sum, the competition argument suggested by the supporters of fragmentation 
states that there is a negative relationship between territorial fragmentation and the level 
of municipal expenditures and grants to sub-city governments, since a high level of 
fragmentation results in competitive pressures to lower service costs and the size of 
transfers. The ‘fragmentation hypothesis’ is: 
 
H1b: Higher levels of territorial fragmentation lead to lower municipal government 
expenditures and transfers to sub-city governments. 
 
The empirical analysis tests these competing hypotheses from the 
amalgamation/consolidation literature in the Portuguese context by examining how 
different levels of fragmentation within Portuguese municipalities affect the level of 
municipal transfers to sub-city governments, and the amount of local government total 
and capital outlays. The following section presents a brief description of the Portuguese 
local government system with a particular emphasis on parish governments. This outline 
should provide the necessary information required for understanding the empirical model. 
 
Research Context: The Portuguese Local Government System 
The Portuguese Constitution recognizes parishes (freguesias) as local governments 
(art. 238). The origin of parishes lies in the V century when the Catholic parishes 
(paróquias) were the delegations of the sedes or cathedra of Episcopal Church. The 
community was built around the church and the priest following communitarian rules. 
Given the spiritual connection between the church and its followers, these became known 
as parishioners (paroquianos) and the congregation as the parish (paróquia). After the 
Liberal Revolution of 1820, many religious institutions were secularized with a more 
evident separation between church and state and the parishes assumed different names, 
depending on their nature. In 1830, parishes were incorporated in the administrative 
system as civil parishes (paróquias civis) as opposed to religious parishes (paróquias 
eclesiásticas). After 1878, the Catholic Parishes remained paróquias, but their political 
equivalent became the freguesia (Pereira and Almeida 1985). 
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Presently, parishes are the smallest unit of local government in Portugal and their 
boundaries are completely contained within a single municipality. The number of 
parishes in which municipality varies significantly, ranging from one (S. João da 
Madeira), where the boundary of the parish coincides with the boundary of the 
municipality, up to 89 (Barcelos), where each parish is essentially equivalent to a 
neighborhood (Silva 2004). The number of parishes can also be regarded as a proxy for 
preference heterogeneity at local level because each parish represents a specific set of 
interests, lobbying the municipal government for more and better services for the 
residents (Tavares and Camões 2007). 
Parishes have democratically elected institutions, including both an executive and a 
deliberative body. The parish council (Assembleia de Freguesia) is a deliberative body 
elected through direct and universal suffrage proportionally to the number of registered 
voters in the parish territory. The parish executive (Junta de Freguesia) is composed by 
the parish president and a variable number of cabinet members, two of which will be the 
secretary and the treasurer. The parish president is the first candidate on the list receiving 
most votes to the parish council. 
Like the municipal government, parish governments have also functional areas 
assigned by law, including the management of rural and urban infra-structure, pre-school 
and elementary school buildings, cemeteries, public kennels, and vacant lands, as well as 
powers in emergency management, planning, community development, and other 
assorted declarations and attestations required by citizens (Law 5-A/2002, January 11). 
Besides these, parish governments can also develop their activities in areas delegated by 
municipal governments through formal agreements involving investments and 
management of infra-structures. Despite this wide range of intervention areas, parish 
executives are usually severely restricted by the lack of financial autonomy and reduced 
yearly budgets that prevent them from completely fulfilling these goals.  
Parishes are classified in three different types for the purpose of central government 
grants to correct regional asymmetries. The Portuguese central government shares part of 
its tax collection revenues with the remaining levels of government. Parishes are entitled 
to 2.5% of the arithmetic mean of the revenues from personal income tax (IRS), corporate 
income tax (IRC), and sales tax (IVA). This intergovernmental grant is the Parish 
Financial Grant (Fundo de Financiamento das Freguesias) – Law of Local Finances 
(Law 2/2007, January 15) (art.21). It is shared in line with the criteria identified in article 
32, according to parish type: urban, semi-urban and rural (see refer to table 1). 
1. Urban parishes – population density above 500 people per square kilometer or with a 
locality with 5,000 or more resident population;  
2. Semi-urban parishes – non-urban parishes with population density above 100 people 
per square kilometer, or with a locality above 2,000 and below 5,000 resident population;  
3. Rural parishes – all the others.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The most relevant own revenue sources of parish governments include: 50% of the 
property tax revenue on rustic/rural buildings, fees charged in services provided by parish 
governments, street markets and fairs, cemeteries, fines and penalties established by law, 
income derived from property rental and revenues from concession contracts. 
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Finally, parish revenues also include municipal grants decided by the parish 
executive and approved by the city council. These transfers from the municipality to its 
parishes entail more flexibility and discretionary power by municipal governments. Thus, 
it becomes relevant to inquire the causes of the variation in municipal transfers and 
whether territorial fragmentation plays a role in the size of these transfers. 
Present-day fiscal pressures and the MoU signed by the Portuguese government 
forced substantial cut-backs at the local level. The exiguity of parishes’ own revenues 
combined with a greater dependence on upper level grants motivated the debate on the 
need to reshape the organizational model of local government. Fragmentation has become 
one major issue of interest and debate and the MoU perspective is that territorial 
amalgamation is the way to promote lower spending, achieve a balanced budget for local 
governments and, at macro level, national financial stability. 
 
Data and Methods 
Does fragmentation explain the size of the local government expenditures and 
transfers to sub-city governments? In order to answer this question, we analyze data from 
the 278 Portuguese municipalities of continental Portugal and its 4050 parishes in an 
attempt to verify a link between fragmentation and spending. The consolidation 
hypothesis suggests that municipalities with a lower degree of fragmentation will display 
lower levels of spending and transfers to their sub-city governments, whereas the 
fragmentation hypothesis argues the exact opposite. Our full model can be represented 
by:  
 
Yi = β0  + β1 (Parishes) + β2 (PolAlig) + β3 (NetDebt) + β4 (MunRevenues) + β5 (APU) + β6 (APR) + β7 
(GovGrants) + β8 (MunGrants) + β9 (Under15) + β10 (Over65) + β11 (Area) + µ  
 
Our dependent variable is the size of local government expenditures. We measure 
this variable using four indicators: total municipal expenditures per capita, capital 
expenditures per capita, total grants per capita to parishes and capital grants per capita. 
All measures are natural logarithmic transformations. The independent variable of 
interest is Parishes, the number of parishes per 1,000 individuals, an indicator that allows 
us to gauge the degree of territorial fragmentation adjusted for the level of population in 
each jurisdiction. Highly fragmented jurisdictions can be compensated by a larger 
population and score low on this indicator of fragmentation. On the other hand, a 
municipality with the same level of fragmentation and less population will score higher. 
A positive sign indicates support for the amalgamation hypothesis, whereas a negative 
sign backs the fragmentation hypothesis. 
Besides the variable gauging the level of municipal fragmentation, the model 
includes several control variables that we believe contribute to explain the level of 
municipal transfers to parishes. A more cohesive local political environment, where most 
parish executives belong to the same political party of the municipal executive, can lead 
to a higher level of grants transferred to their parish. Since these grants are discretionary 
and reflect the level of trust between levels of local government, we can extend the 
political fragmentation argument to the Portuguese city council. A ‘political alignment’ 
hypothesis can be drawn stating that municipal executives ensure more financial 
assistance to parishes when the proportion of parish executives belonging to the same 
political party is larger. So, we expect that higher levels of political alignment will be 
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associated with higher levels of municipal government transfers to parishes. Our political 
alignment variable (PolAlg) is measured as the proportion of parish governments in the 
municipality belong to the same political party as the mayor. A positive coefficient is 
expected for this variable. 
 NetDebt is the difference obtained by subtracting the assets to the liabilities of the 
municipality. This variable allows us to control the effect of the overall financial situation 
of each municipality. It is expected that in situations of higher debt, municipalities will be 
more limited in their spending as well as in the level of grants attributed to parish 
governments. MunRevenues is the proportion of municipal own revenues and measures 
the fiscal health of a community. It is expect that wealthier jurisdictions are more willing 
to share more funds with parishes. APU is the proportion of urban parishes in each 
municipality and APR is the proportion of rural parishes in each municipality. The 
omitted category is that of semi-urban parishes. We expect that spending and grants will 
be larger in urban parishes and smaller in rural parishes. GovGrants is the natural log of 
the total central government grants to parishes. Work by Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) 
shows that cities receiving more intergovernmental grants present higher expenditure 
levels for all services. We do not have any a priori expectation regarding the relationship 
between the size of central governmental grants to parishes and municipal spending, but 
it makes intuitive sense to argue that local governments will spend less if their parishes 
are already receiving grants from the central government. MunGrants is the natural log of 
municipal government grants per capita to parishes and is expected to be positively 
associated with local government expenditures. Under15 is the proportion of resident 
population under 15 years of age in the municipality and Over65 is the proportion of 
resident population over 65 years old in the municipality. Area is the area of the 
municipality in square kilometers. Positive coefficients are expected for these three 
demographic variables as they express a measure of social welfare needs. Data were 
collected from the General Directorate of Local Government (Direcção-Geral das 
Autarquias Locais) and the National Bureau of Statistics (INE). Table 2 displays a 
summary of descriptive statistics of all variables included in the analysis. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to estimate the models using 
the grants conceded from municipalities to parishes (natural logarithm) as the dependent 
variable. The results of the OLS regressions are presented on table 3. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Empirical Findings 
 The overall results confirm the idea that there is a positive relationship between 
the level of fragmentation and local government size, thus lending support for the 
amalgamation hypothesis. In three out of four models, fragmentation measured as the 
number of parish governments per 1000 population increases the size of government in 
terms of total municipal expenditures, capital expenditures and capital grants to parish 
governments. The fragmentation variable is still positive in the case of total grants to 
parish governments, but barely misses statistical significance. As expected, our models 
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are better at explaining the size of local government expenditures than the amount of 
grant transfers to parish governments. Nevertheless, the overall performance of the four 
models is fairly consistent with our prior expectations. 
Starting with total municipal expenditures, we find that each additional parish per 
1000 individuals increases, on average, the amount of total spending by 10 percent. 
Interestingly, the results also show that this effect is somewhat offset by central 
government transfers to parishes. In other words, an increase in central government 
grants by one log reduces total local spending by 27 percent. Perhaps the most impressive 
result is the impact of elderly population in municipal expenditures at the municipal level. 
This effect is extremely large, both in terms of total and capital local government 
expenditures, and entirely consistent with recent empirical work (MacDonald 2008; Carr 
and Karuppusamy 2010). 
The results of the capital expenditures model are consistent with the total 
expenditures model. Again, each additional parish increases, on average, the amount of 
capital expenditures by 14 percent. A similar effect occurs in terms of central government 
grants: an increase in central government grants by one log reduces total local spending 
by 16 percent. In addition, both models indicate that, all else equal, an increase in net 
debt by 10,000 Euros per capita decreases total and capital expenditures by 1 percent. 
Next, we analyze the results of the models explaining the size of municipal 
transfers to parishes. The results are fairly consistent with our previous findings. 
Fragmentation increases the level of capital grants to parish governments. Specifically, a 
one-unit increase in sub-city fragmentation increases the amount of capital grants to 
parishes by a whopping 47 percent. This suggests that fragmentation is particularly 
responsible for infrastructure spending at the parish level, something that is less prevalent 
in less fragmented municipalities. 
The models explaining municipal transfers to parishes are also interesting by 
contrast with those addressing municipal expenditures. The results above show that 
central government grants to parishes are negatively related with municipal spending, 
which can be easily understood since local governments are required to spend less with 
parish governments if an upper level of government is already doing this. However, when 
we look at municipal grants to parishes we see that they are positively associated with 
central government grants to parishes. This result is consistent with the idea that parish 
governments are heavily dependent on upper level grants, so that some parishes receive 
cumulatively central government grants and municipal transfers.  
The variation in capital grants to parishes can also be explained by the type of 
parish. It appears that municipal transfers are higher in municipalities where there are a 
larger proportion of semi-urban parishes. Capital grants to parishes are also less frequent 
in municipal jurisdictions characterized by populations in need (under 15 years-old or 
above 65). This indicates that capital grants are directed towards communities with a 
larger proportion of working population. 
  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 This paper contributes to the territorial amalgamation/fragmentation literature in 
several ways. First, our findings clearly indicate that municipalities with higher levels of 
fragmentation are associated with higher municipal expenditures and larger transfers to 
sub-city governments. Thus, from a purely economic perspective, a territorial reform that 
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promotes parish amalgamations is likely to produce significant savings at the local level 
and promote efficiency in the use of taxpayer’s money. However, in political science, the 
small is beautiful motto is upheld by the empirical literature linking small jurisdiction 
size with increased voter turnout (Oliver 2000; Larsen 2002) political participation 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Oliver 2000) and internal political efficacy (Lassen and Serritzlew 
2011). Fragmentation is thus regarded as positive for the quality of the local democracy 
as smaller jurisdictions improve citizen’s feelings of competence to understand as well as 
participate in local politics. Recent work argues that, from a quality of democracy 
perspective, increased municipal fragmentation into sub-city governments improves 
democratic representation and civic and political participation by local citizens (Carr and 
Tavares 2012; Tavares and Carr forthcoming). The confluence of these findings is 
consistent with the trade-off between economic efficiency and political participation 
proposed by prior work in the fiscal federalism literature (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). 
Second, our results do not support the ‘fragmentation hypothesis’, since more 
fragmented municipalities are associated with both higher expenditures and larger grants 
to their sub-city governments. However, this finding can be understood in light of one 
specific feature of the Portuguese local government system. Local governments in 
Portugal are not responsible for collecting local taxes and their discretion in setting 
property tax rates is highly constricted by national legislation. As a result, the tax 
competition effect that drives the Leviathan model argued by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1977; 1980) is unlikely to work in the Portuguese context. This feature weakens the 
relationship between citizens and representatives and generates a fiscal common property 
from which parish governments attempt to graze as much as possible (Padovano 2004). 
Finally, recent work by Elgie and McMenamin (2008) finds that institutional 
fragmentation in ageing democracies leads to excessive depletion of the common pool of 
the central government budget. Our findings point to a similar effect at the local 
government level in Portugal. Even though the Portuguese democracy is still fairly young 
(just under 40 years-old), the overwhelming majority of parish governments are almost 
two hundred years-old. When combined with our results, this context suggests that the 
fragmentation effect is becoming more severe as these institutions become more 
embedded, thus crediting the need for territorial reform outlined in the MoU. 
The MoU signed by the IMF/EU/ECB and the Portuguese government points a 
solution to the problem of territorial fragmentation that is consistent with the 
amalgamation hypothesis, recommending the mandatory amalgamation of parish 
governments in order to improve the efficiency and economies of scale to be achieved by 
these territorial units and reduce the tendency to overspend from the common municipal 
pool. Our work provides empirical evidence that supports the policy recommendations by 
the MoU, thus underlining the need for territorial reform of Portuguese parishes. 
However, we stress that any reform should be accompanied by a revision of functions 
assigned to parish governments as well as the adoption of a funding mechanism that links 
taxes and service benefits through the user-pays principle. 
The territorial reform of Portuguese local government is currently under 
implementation, largely determined by national legislation adopted by the center-right 
coalition government lead by Prime-Minister Passos Coelho. Future work should address 
this highly complex process, namely the role played by city council members in a reform 
that affects them directly. Although the reform is based on criteria mandated by 
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legislation, there is some discretion regarding the actual amalgamation choices. Perhaps 
one of the most interesting topics of future research is the analysis of which city councils 
voluntarily engaged in parish amalgamations respecting top-down predefined criteria and 
which ones did not, and why. After the institutionalization of this reform, work 
comparing before-and-after spending will be of extreme value to determine whether this 
reform actually achieved the goals of its proponents.  
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Table 1. Central Government Grants to Parishes (Criteria and Weights) 
Parish Financial 
Grant Criteria Weight 
2,5% of the arithmetic 
mean of the revenues 
from personal income 
tax (IRS), corporate 
income tax (IRC) and 
sales tax (IVA) 
5% equally shared by all parishes 
Population 30% proporcional 
Area 15% proporcional 
Typology 50% according to parish type 
14% urban parishes 
11% semi-urban 
parishes 
25% rural parishes 
 
 
  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Total expenditures per capita (ln) 278 6.925 .466 5.824 8.099 
Capital expenditures per capita (ln) 278 5.935 .587 4.099 7.464 
Total grants per capita (ln) 266 2.805 1.151 -2.922 4.864 
Capital grants per capita (ln) 218 2.3 1.368 -5.896 4.587 
Independent      
Fragmentation (parish units per 1000) 278 .889 .807 .032 4.237 
Control      
Political Alignment (% same party) 278     .686  .222     0           1 
Net indebtedness (per capita) 278     -778.368 732.096  -6694.879 915.538 
Municipalities Own Revenues (%) 278 .317  .177  .038 .809 
APU (%) 278     .237 .302   0           1 
APR (%)   278     .525   .325  0          1 
Area (km2) 278     320.026  283.605   7.943   1720.609 
Governmental grants to parishes (ln) 278     13.25  .637  12.154  15.624 
Grant transfers to parishes per capita (ln) 266     2.805   1.151 -2.922  4.864 
Population under 15 (%) 278     .133  .025  .067  .188 
Population over 65 (%) 278     .221 .056  .107 .4 
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Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
 
  
 
 
Municipal Expenditures Municipal Grant Transfers to Parishes 
Total 
Expenditures  
 per capita (ln) 
Capital 
Expenditures  
per capita (ln) 
Total grants  
per capita (ln) 
Capital grants  
per capita (ln) 
Independent 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Fragmentation (parish units per 1000s) .1092*** 
(.0298) 
.142*** 
(.041) 
.16 
(.136) 
.47*** 
  (.148) 
Control     
Political Alignment (% same party) -.0103 
(.0809) 
.035 
(.117) 
.195 
(.281) 
.046 
  (.344) 
Net indebtedness (per capita) -.0001** 
(.0001) 
-.0001* 
(.0001) 
.00001 
(.0001) 
.0001 
 (.0001) 
Municipalities Own Revenues (%) .056 
(.11) 
.073 
(.1646) 
.3 
(.33) 
-.318  
 (.476) 
APU (%) .066 
(.101) 
-.215 
(.152) 
-.795* 
(.431) 
-.929***    
(.402) 
APR (%) .055 
(.123) 
.085 
(.164) 
-.582 
(.432) 
-1.136*** 
 (.445) 
Area (km2) .0003** 
(.0001) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.0006** 
(.0002) 
.001** 
(.0004) 
Governmental grants to parishes (ln) -.27*** 
(.0529) 
-.162*** 
(.06) 
.47*** 
(.13) 
.36** 
(.169) 
Grant transfers to parishes per capita (ln) .0167 
(.016) 
-.001 
(.023) - 
- 
Population under 15 (%) 2.149 
(1.836) 
-.764 
(2.611) 
-.37 
(6.056) 
-18.375**    
(7.554) 
Population over 65 (%) 3.88*** 
(.87) 
3.229*** 
(1.075) 
.839 
(2.532) 
-6.824** 
   (3.215) 
Constant 8.978*** 
(.935) 
7.184*** 
(1.07) 
-3.632 
(2.465) 
1.717 
   (2.907) 
Observations 266 266 266 218 
F  55.48 29.49 5.64 7.92 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
R2 .656 .5365 .1331 .184 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
